(longer description also available) Addresses in detail the operations and leadership of German tank general Heinz Guderian from 22 June 1941 through his dismissal from the command of Second Panzer Army in late December 1941
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Guderian in Discord category "Seminar Room" Voice Channel | Text Channel |
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(from Dr Craig Luther, author / presenter)
In my latest eastern front book, I address in detail the operations and leadership of German tank general Heinz Guderian from 22 June 1941 through his dismissal from the command of Second Panzer Army in late December 1941. Using a mix of primary and secondary sources—among them many of Guderian’s revealing letters to his wife—I follow on a daily basis the activities of Guderian, his top lieutenants, and his rank and file tank crews and grenadiers as they battle their way across Soviet Russia to the outskirts of the strategic town of Tula (which they failed to secure despite weeks of trying) some 150 kilometers due south of Moscow. In doing so, I examine the strengths and weaknesses of Wehrmacht “blitzkrieg” doctrine—which Guderian himself had played a major role in developing in the mid-1930s—in the greatest military conflict the world has ever witnessed. I conclude that Guderian never fully understood the unique dynamic and unprecedented requirements of warfare against a nation that made up one-sixth of the earth’s surface, with underdeveloped infrastructure (road and rail), often catastrophic weather, and an Army imbued with both Communist ideology and a profound sense of national pride. As Guderian and so many of his men soon realized after 22 June, “Russia is not France!”